Some data points of note...

• In 1998, McCain put an e-donation tool on his website and got 3 donations.
• By Nov 2007, the McCain campaign had bought over 10,000 keywords for Internet advertising... at that point they lost count.

The campaign cycle started at the close of the 2006 elections. McCainSpace launched in 2006 assuming that there would be a groundswell of support -- "It was McCain's turn." The initial plan was forward thinking, the branding was edgy: "Informing you, Involving you, Connecting you." But starting in Nov-Dec 2006, a split develops within the campaign with shifts at the top. One of the top leaders needed the website printed out to review. And the McCainiacs weren't donating -- something was wrong.

Why the keyword ad buys? Think about the poorly connected people whose first step is to do searches for information. A deep website made it easy to put out ads immediately with deep links to McCain's positions. But the buys always held to a strict ROI, with ad buys linked to money brought back in through ad-related donations.

"The radical innovation in 2008 wasn't as much innovation as it was integration." When the McCain campaign had to go skinny, the core that was left was Internet. (It turned out the large, presumptive nominee structure wasn't sustainable). The Web team took over traditional roles, e.g. Web video became the campaign's TV advertising.

The RNC made its voter file available to all the Presidential campaigns. McCain's team had people who had years of experience working that database. It was one of the RNC's core advantages over the DNC for several cycles -- this was the year the DNC caught up. And also the same database ported over to the generals, eliminating transition energy.

Arranged for the voter file to be matched against the rosters of Yahoo, MSN, AOL, allowing them to reach out to supporters with targeted ads.

McCain Nation launched in summer 2008, which became the platform for the voter-to-voter outreach, online phonebank. "We certainly scratched the surface" but can do more to be more fully integrated with field. (McCain Nation was designed to bring in Hillary supporters.)

e-Campaigning touched every piece of the campaign, or it should. So e-campaigning a bit of a misnomer: it does very similar work to TV ads, for example. The Internet team raised 1/3 of the primary moneys; 1/4 for the generals; they raised money by selling swag ($200 fleece jackets). The e-campaign essentially became jack-of-all-trades.

For a large part of 2007, the McCain campaign's e-campaign had 1 paid staff, expanding to a maximum of 12. "We did a lot with little resources." ...though... "We'd rather do it their [Obama's] way next time."

Biggest mistake or regret? "Win in 2000."

Make it into the DNA of how things get done. For the campaign to have a better understanding of what the e-campaign can do. There was still a need to educate the offline people.

Translating donors / merchandise buyers into activists? These would presumably be the most dedicated supporters -- "not as large as the other campaigns'." Activists vs. donors, "It's really hard to get them to cross."

The bloggers and blogosphere was greatly important to our comeback in fall 2007. McCain would do wide-ranging open calls with bloggers. "Those calls were very very impactful" -- especially because McCain was not a favorite of the right.

Re: the online rumors about Obama, the Internet team had no role in managing it, putting the rumors down, etc. Even putting out a different message would have made it worse.

Lack of McCain YouTube videos -- "Put it down to a lack of resources... We had one Web video guy." What about supporters? "We would have loved a Will.I.Am video." "Our audience was different from the Obama audience" -- not a lot of young people with talent and time.

Behaviors of online activists on the left are not the same as on the right. You're more likely to see Open Source on the left, while on the right it's a more button-down corporate culture where we want a company we can call. The entire site was built in .Net.

Defensive Web strategies -- using paid search in the response to the Palin announcement. e.g. one of the hottest search terms was "nude Palin photo." The Web team had already prepared five different logos with the joint names -- Palin was not one of them. The team wasn't in on the information. Google was very helpful in getting the ads up quickly. After her announcement, they never had to run banner ads again to get people to come to McCain events.

“Media Beyond the Gatekeepers.”

We’re now beyond the question of who’s a journalist – everyone is now a “reporter” (as distinct from journalist). Three interesting questions:

1. How is this affecting quality? Are we at risk of “urban blight” from the bloggers’ “new city”? What is the border between the new city and the old city? How porous is the boundary and what causes messages to leak between?
2. Is the new media without gatekeepers breeding more reasoned discussion or more extreme discourse? Do extreme viewpoints break out of their “echo chambers”? Empirically: Not usually, though more positive messages have more chance of breaking out. Also, there’s more of a window on the liberal side of the blogosphere. See: shiftingthedebate.com
3. Is this stuff really interactive? Is YouTube truly an interactive media? Is it therefore different?

“Transparency and Participation.”

1. Participants agree that it’s government’s role to provide information – transparency is good. FOIA is wrong-headed in putting the responsibility on the citizen, not the government.
2. But – if you build it, will they come? Will people get firehosed with data?
3. How do you engage people? Some ideas that work: Peer to Patent, Everyblock, FixMyStreet.

What about games like Fantasy Congress as ways to view data?

There’s also value in transparency for the players within government themselves, much as the Facebook newsfeed makes friends’ activities visible – government officials need to know what each other are doing.

The enemy is the status quo

“Micro-Targeting and Campaign Messaging”

The Obama campaign hired most of the remaining journalists (joke). This was a Presidential campaign that was the opposite of micro-targeting: “Hope” and “Change” was a perfect example of macro-targeting. In an era of increasing transparency, how do you practice dog-whistle politics? It’s now both easier and harder: easier in that resources are more available to the campaigns, but it’s harder in making sure the message is forwarded (how to get it to go viral).

We’re seeing the democratization of targeting; the top 20 YouTube videos of either campaign, the majority were not made by the campaign (people or independent groups).

A voter file can have 200 data points, but you will have much more effective knowledge about your friend. You’ll probably see voter files

Regretted messages? Maybe Ron Paul’s backwards “LOVE” / Revolution logo a bit “hippy” for the Republican party.

McCain campaign wished they paid more for their logo, branding.

One example of the Obama campaign making use of outsiders saying things they didn’t want to say include the “Dirt off your shoulders” reference explaining on YouTube.

Another regret was the Obama online campaign putting the onus on the user rather than already have a national network of local groups.

Teaching Obama volunteers to tell their own story was the opposite of the idea of the top-down message – releasing a diversity of approaches around a commonality of values. Messaging as enablement, not control.

“Distributed Collaboration”

The TwitterVoteReport – something that could be built quickly and cheaply.

The decentralized Ron Paul campaign lacked an infrastructure and leadership. So one of the nodes started the “Money Bomb” idea that surprised the campaign, but worked. “The self-organization can get you off the runway, but not necessarily keep you in the air.”

What might distributed collaboration look like in 10 years? We should watch for indicia such as people learning through collaboration (learning = sustaining the collaboration).

There was some skepticism that large groups could collaborate effectively without leadership unless it’s reduced to very small, defined, discrete tasks. But… there are people on the Internet doing very complex tasks that may herald future possibility. The two-by-two grid would be top-down/bottom-up on one axis and authentic participation/consumption.

Have all the tools been invented? No – we need better tools, and we need to share more best practices of existing tools. (For example, wikis are hard to get started without editors.)

Again, these sessions are officially under Chatham House rules.

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What’s transformational about the technology? Beyond efficiencies, what’s profoundly different? Probably Obama would be the President-elect without the Internet. What’s profoundly different is that we’re able to have a huge public conversation: it’s revolutionary.

If you don’t have the impetus to use the tools, does it matter at all. I saw “A million strong for Hillary” picking up 100 a day when Obama was picking up 50,000. It was clear something was going on at the grassroots level – the energy was there.

Two things we found, 2:1 or 3:1, Hillary supporters were less likely to use the Internet as a political tool, or a tool at all. And no sense that it was make-or-break at the grassroots level. Perception was that she was the front-runner, nothing would change that – that she didn’t need the grassroots. It was a difficult process until Iowa; then it was “Oh my god you needed me Hillary.”

Build it… and they don’t necessarily come. Without the inspiration or organic movement – what do you do?

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How did the method of mobilization affect how they stayed active? Found those who come out of Internet mobilization vs. face-to-face leading to different engagement. The medium changes the communication. How did the medium of the Internet change the face-to-face relationship?

How does the movement change as the targets change? Often, it fizzles out.

What’s the difference between organizers and volunteers? There’s very different retention rates depending on what they do. How many of those who gave money went on to make phone calls, etc.

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Comparison of 2004 and 2008: the winners had a large base of energy. How to channel and empower it: what are the actions you need people to do to be successful. It’s doorknocking and phonebanking and letter-writing. In 2008 there were new metrics: 2+ million friends on Facebook, 13 million names on the email list (compare 7 million for Bush in 2004). Are these indicators of real grassroots support?

2008 was a transformational cycle: there are new chapters in the playbook, and existing chapters have to be rethought.

Using Facebook to push a link to supporters that is more than just a “finger in the wind” – it is a new way to bring people to action.

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What’s the difference between campaign organizing and a movement? How do you channel the energy? Compare the Dean campaign, which also had a lot of energy. The online desire for openness and doing what it wants to do. Re: Facebook, the social network doesn’t necessarily reflect geography – how to marry those when people don’t overlap.

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MoveOn’s effort to transform precinct captains into local communities failed – there were no traditional structures like churches. Instead, the switch to cities has worked through hierarchical councils under regional coordinators. Members are looking for community. The email list helps members see they are members of a larger community; they will drive 50 miles to go to local meetups.

Members are best representatives to other members: much more effective than when staff send out emails. People wanted to get together face-to-face around common action. Our members cross-affiliate: enormous overlap with the Obama list and are active in both as best as we can tell.

Challenge is to prevent the loudest voice from disrupting the room. We have not cracked universal dialogue. Trolls were able to taint the organization.

How to scale? How can organizing succeed on energy across members in both California and in coal states?

Discussion

Bush 2004 campaign focused on taking audience online and channeling them offline. The last thing we wanted was to build a community on GeorgeWBush.com the way they did for Howard Dean. If you get them for 7 minutes, what do you want them to do in those 7 minutes. But in 2008, if you didn’t have a community on your website, you weren’t in a position to move them offline. And when you move them offline, there were experienced people to put them into a program. There need to be trained staff, and energy, and the platform / tools to support the base.

It doesn’t have to be paid staff – Obama ran staging locations across Ohio without paid staff at each location. It can be done – if there’s the right training and accountability. The barrier to getting a trained person is so much lower now than before. Training has traditionally meant how to make a phone call, etc., but this time the training was in leadership – not just do a tactic but learn from the tactic and come up with new ones – and to do it together, which creates capacity. And then to be able to train others.

Organizing is not a zero-sum game. The toughest part is getting people through the door. Once we engage people, the more we find them getting involved in other action. Yes, people have finite time, but they find more effective ways to act. The challenge is to figure out how to develop leadership, moving from a money-centralized organization. But nobody has a model for maximizing the energy that exists.

You’re always leaving something on the table, e.g. using tactics that didn’t empower local leaders, or didn’t train well. We were late in getting the technology integrated, especially to get people who joined at the end involved (e.g. put into a specific shift at a specific time).

What’s accountability: They were trained, and there was followup. It sounds like a top-down term, but it’s also the sense that the organization respected what they were doing, that what they were doing mattered. In terms of firing volunteer leaders (or any leader), the measure was hitting goals, and hitting them consistent with organizational imperatives/philosophies.

What about civic society beyond governance? What if the grassroots is coopted as a marketing medium? The power structure has not been shaken by this medium – so what is powerful is the unpredictable conversation happening? Shifting conventional wisdom vs. “just” organizing.

See the aftermath of the Palin announcement. The Obama campaign was out of sync with the public discussion, which was self-organizing and self-mobilization that completely transformed the election. You cannot control that.

It’s a lot easier to do national organizing, but issues are often local. How do you bring that down to the local level. But on the other hand, is “All politics are local” still true? We’re more nationalized now – what will it take to self-organize. People are not organizing as much around pothole issues? Is it happening at scale? Or has the definition of “local” changed because of the Internet, globalization?

Having a mission and goals for the organization is not top-down; it’s putting parameters on the organization. Once there was an agreement on goals, when leaders were empowered on how to devise strategies and tactics is when the local leaders were at their best. That’s how the barbershop and beauty salon program was launched.

Rather than top-down vs. bottom-up is parts vs. wholes. The question for the whole is how to elect this guy President, but then there are questions at the local level, how to figure out how people can contribute the maximum to this strategic purpose. “Top-down” vs. “Bottom-up” puts into inappropriately normative terms the problem how to focus collective energy. The beauty of a campaign is the clarity of the goal, that’s a maximum-motivating condition. The biggest issue moving forward is identifying clear strategic goals.

What about an online offense? (Trolling, astroturfing, etc.) Anonymity is the source of power for the individual. Transparency is the source of power for an organization.

People want to remain involved [with the Obama campaign] because they built relationships. It wasn’t just about the candidate but about health care, education. Still, it’s going to be challenging.

At some point in the future, television ads won’t work – everyone will Tivo them. So less and less will be spent on traditional media. More money will be spent on how to reach people via cell phone, until people stop answering.

False dichotomies of global vs. local, top-down vs. bottom-up -- these are normative terms we need to erase. What we know is that people want to engage. The challenge is to see ourselves as facilitators of that energy.

The majority of the conference will be held by Chatham House rules -- no attribution. But the keynotes are open, and here's the first one, featuring Prof. Marshall Ganz (Harvard Kennedy School) and Jeremy Bird (Obama for America).

Building Collective Capacity : New Forms of Political Organizing

Marshall is giving a backgrounder on organizing as a general matter. He has significant resources available on this topic elsewhere (see his interview with Micah), but here is the quick summary:

What's needed for purposeful collective action?

1. Leadership: Achieving shared purpose in the face of uncertainty.

2. Community: A collective entity capable of exercising agency.

3. Power: A community able to use its resources to achieve its purposes.

Enablers:

1. Shared values (broader than interests -- they are the sources of motivation)

2. Peer commitments

3. Shared structure

4. Shared strategy

5. Shared action

6. Action that is clear, specific, intentional, and can be learned from

To what extent can new technologies support these activities? (Or detract from?)

The Obama campaign emphasized carpenters, not tools.

Now for Jeremy's response:

The "Jazz" and "Classical" metaphor from 2004 describes the connection well. Start with the startegy and look at technology as a resource. Four stories that illustrate the interdependence between technology and strategy.

1. April 11, 2007 -- Florence, South Carolina. Not necessarily the most tech-savvy state. In putting together tickets, were planning to capture emails, but then decided to also capture cell phones. In December with Oprah, asked 30,000 to text the campaign and also capture their numbers. Texting underappreciated -- were able to text just the team leaders. Or have volunteers send back pictures to keep other teams motivated. South Carolina house meeting program. Sam Graham-Feldson came to shoot video.
Despite the written program, no one knew what they were doing. What the video did was tell the story: both to the rest of the campaign and to the community. (at 7:31, all the volunteers knew we'd won via the text message program).

3. Maryland. Teams who organized themselves using the MyBO tools. With two weeks left when Jeremy arrived to GOTV. This was a very different environment with much tighter connectedness. Through the 'Net, bring together the volunteers into trainings, sufficient to hit every voter 3 times before the primary.

4. Pennsylvania. 8 weeks to go while TX and OH is going on. Took the online tool, PATeams tool, that allowed volunteers to log in and target neighbors. It was the "classical" and the "jazz" coming together. It enabled the volunteers to set and hit goals without setting up an office, to connect folks together and not just "go online and make calls" -- they felt they were part of a community. Eventually led to the neighbor-to-neighbor tool.

5. Ohio (general election). We started to shoot all sorts of video. It was one of the most important things we did, because it told the story of what we were doing. Nationally, we set up VoteForChange.com that allowed people to download and turn in voter registration forms. As every individual downloaded the form, it gave organizers information about voters -- but it turned out it was the most rich source of volunteers. These were young people who sought this out themselves.

These are still designed with field and new people sitting together. In 2008 we're still figuring out if new media is a separate thing. We're trying to figure out how to make organizing and online organizing work together.

In Maryland, a statewide group of 150 were already meeting every Saturday, all volunteers leading their own teams created through MyBO. Is it possible to use this technology for smaller campaigns? How to do it without the 2,500 paid campaign organizers that the Obama campaign had? The person who raises their hands first to be the leader may not be the best leader. One of the key questions is how to build leaders – how to define, how to select, are there tests? The hard part is that many of these are interpersonal skills; it’s not like learning geography. Marshall is trying to develop a distance course, but people will enroll as teams, not individuals. “Self-organization” is a chimera, a wish. It takes skill and practice. Buffy, in CA, was able to produce more calls per organizer than most other states using the technology to leverage. This was not the traditional leadership structure: we launched interdependent teams with shared norms, which diverged from the usual top-down individuals who burn out or have other issues. Coaching plays a critical role here. (Just because it’s face-to-face doesn’t mean it’s traditional).

Videos to ask people to sign up were very effective – saw great numbers. A good video, connected to a real narrative, and a way to capture people who say they want to do something connected to that. One of the real challenges is communication of emotion, affect, via the Internet. It’s easy to express emotion but harder to experience it, lacking the empathetic component. Video enables empathetic communication.

Counterfactually, what if Cesar Chavez had different tools – what difference do the tools vs. the carpenter make? If the Farmworkers collapsed because of a lack of accountability, then this risk is heightened without empathetic interaction. There was a time when the Farmworkers tried to market rather than organize the boycott – disastrous – perhaps the Internet would make this worse.

What to do when the wrong person becomes a team leader? Fire them. In PA, with only 8 weeks, we messed up. We spent too much time trying to figure out how to support bad leaders. Is there was more transparency because of the Internet tools – more data to measure outcomes.

Change.gov is, with “deliberate haste,” trying to figure out how to move forward. Still going through 500,000 responses to the survey, much of it qualitative. Last week’s conference of best team leaders to figure out what worked in the campaign. This weekend another round of house parties to keep getting more feedback. All of this is to figure out what the community wants. We’re not just asking the house parties to meet but do a service project around the holidays.

Re: Marshall’s interview with TechPresident – Marshall now states he perhaps was being impatient without an understanding of “deliberate haste.” The campaign is gathering lessons learned, which is wise.

But governance is different than both campaign mobilizing and community organizing. It’s key for us to know how to set up the organization. Also, the campaign was doing a lot of learning from mistakes and successes, and this has some resemblance to gathering feedback from the citizenry. A movement hasn’t emerged within an administration before – but why can’t government get people involved in the same way that the campaign trained team leaders.

The Obama campaign had enormous resources – “Don’t expect that to be the norm.” People contributed because they wanted to know that there’d be an office in their community – they could see the results. Alinksy: “There’s organized people, and there’s organized money.” Barack figured out how to do both.

You can offer tools, but you have to get people into the tools. The context was vital.